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Tweet #188

Guillermo Rauch @rauchg

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I built πšŒπš™πšž-πšŒπš‘πšŠπš, a reproduction of @openai's findings of covert communication using the CPU. It runs on a generic host with 2+ Firecracker microVMs with no internet access. Works on x86 and even my ο£ΏM5 chip. I was able to chat via 3 separate mechanisms: β‘  CPU contention β‘‘ Cache eviction timing β‘’ DRAM bandwidth contention … across multiple CPUs, defeating all Firecracker's production recommendations (no SMT, no KSM, tenants pinned to different cores.) Essentially, if shared hardware is involved, there's a good chance your agents can communicate covertly. And with really decent latency. The good news: this is decidedly different from a *side-channel attack* where the agents could steal information (Meltdown/Spectre), a category of attack that providers like Vercel Sandbox mitigate. Further, in our real-world environment, these 'whispering' techniques are much harder to pull off and easier for us to monitor and detect (sampling hardware counters + lots of at-scale statistica…

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